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THE DO-NOT-CALL REGISTRY
MODEL IS NOT THE ANSWER
TO SPAM
RICHARD

C. BALOUGHt

I. INTRODUCTION
The overwhelming response to the federal Do-Not-Call telephone
registry maintained by the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") indicates
that telephone customers do not like to receive telemarketing calls at
home.' Whether the Do-Not-Call telephone registry will ultimately re2
duce unwanted telemarketing as planned remains to be seen.
A recent survey of Internet users indicated that they would like to
see a Do-Not-Spam registry as well. But, as will be discussed here, differences between Internet spain and telephone telemarketing make an
"opt-out" Do-Not-Spam registry an impractical model to the Internet
users' lament.
A.

ONE

PERSON'S SPAM is ANOTHER PERSON'S VALUABLE INFORMATION

It is difficult to precisely define spain. As the Paul Simon song goes,
t Richard C. Balough is a practicing attorney in Chicago, IL. His practice focuses on
Internet law and privacy issues. He is a graduate of Indiana University with a degree in
government and journalism. He obtained his Juris Doctor degree and his Masters of Law
degree in Intellectual Property, cum laude, from The John Marshall Law School. He is
completing his studies for a second Masters of Law degree in Information Technology and
Privacy Law from The John Marshall Law School. He can be contacted at
rbalough@balough.com.
1. Consumers on Do Not Call Registry File over 15,000 Complaints Against
Telemarketers, <http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/10/dnccomplaints.htm> (Oct. 16, 2003). As of
the middle of October 2003, more than 53.7 million residential telephone numbers have
been registered on the Do-Not-Call list maintained by the Federal Trade Commission. The
Commission has predicted registrations will grow to sixty million numbers by the summer
2004. Associated Press, Telemarketing Group Sues FCC, Industry Seeks Another Challenge
to Do-Not-Call List, <http://www.msnbc.com/news/945151.asp> (July 28, 2003).
2. Id. As of October 16, 2003, the FTC had received more than 15,000 complaints
against telemarketers from residential customers who signed up for the Do-Not-Call registry. Nearly 21,000 organizations have accessed the registry with 550 telemarketers
downloading all area codes in the registry. On average, each telemarketer retrieved about
forty-five area codes from the total national database of 317 area codes.
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"Remember: one man's ceiling is another man's floor." 3 So it is with
spam also. Unsolicited commercial e-mail sent to one person may be
spam while the same message to another may be the message he or she
wants. 4 That being said, however, most would agree that the enormous
volume of unsolicited commercial e-mail causes problems for the recipi6
ents.5 It takes time to sort through the spam and it clogs e-mail boxes.
The shear volume of spam affects the operation of the Internet. It has
required Internet Service Providers ("ISPs") to institute blocking mechanisms and has forced many consumers to buy anti-spam programs to
load onto their individual computers. Not only is there a cost in blocking
spam, but there is the added problem caused when non-spam e-mails are
blocked. As an AOL spokesman recently said, "[w]e block first and ask
questions later when it comes to suspicious e-mail." 7 This blocking has
included the FTC's own e-mail confirmation messages for persons enroll8
ing in the Do-Not-Call registry.
The cost of computing power used by spam and the wasted time has
been estimated at ten billion dollars in the United States for 2003 and
$20.5 billion worldwide. 9 The European Union found that
...
unsolicited commercial communications may on the one hand be
relatively easy and cheap to send and on the other may impose a burden
and/or cost on the recipient. Moreover, in some cases their volume may
also cause difficulties for electronic communications networks and terminal equipment.10
3. One Man's Ceiling is Another Man's Floor in There Goes Rhymin' Simon, Artist
Paul Simon, Warner Bros. Records, 1973.
4. For example, if you are in the market to refinance your mortgage, you may want to
read unsolicited e-mail advertisements from a mortgage company. However, if you rent,
the same e-mail advertisement may be of no interest to you.
5. ePrivacy Group, The Economics of Spam, <http://www.eprivacygroup.com/article/
articlestatic/58/1/6> (Feb. 2003). The economics of spam do not encourage target marketing since the cost to send the e-mail does not increase by the volume of e-mail sent but
rather is fixed. Moreover, the cost is largely borne by the recipient. Compare this to the
economics of snail mail or telemarketing where every piece of mail or every telephone call
has an associated cost. "In a nutshell, the parasitic economics of spam means this: the act
of sending a message costs the sender less than it costs all other parties impacted by the
sending of the message."
6. Hansell, Saul, Totaling Up the Bill for Spam, Wasted Time, Computer and Human,
Is Only Part of the Cost, N.Y. Times (July 28, 2003).
7. Mangalindan, Mylene, Didn't Get E-Mail? That Could Be Spam's Fault, Too. Vigilant Blockers Toss Out the Good With the Bad; Artist Misses Own Show, Wall St. J. (Aug. 4,
2003).
8. Id.
9. Hansell, supra n. 6.
10. Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July
2002, Official Journal of the European Communities 31.7.2002, L201141.
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B.

INTERNET USERS

Do

NOT WANT UNSOLICITED COMMERCIAL E-MAILS

12
11
According to a study by ePrivacy Group and Ponemon Institute
published in July 2003:
Unwanted solicitations represent more than 25% of all e-mail traffic
getting through to 61% of consumers inboxes every day. Nearly 40% of
consumers spend 30 minutes or more each day just dealing with
13

spam.
The same report that surveyed a sample of 1,090 adults in the United
States found:

1. Most consumers support a Do-Not-Spam list, federal law and legal
penalties to deter spammers. (A total of seventy-four percent of those
surveyed stated they wanted a federal do-not spam list).
2. Current solutions to stop unwanted e-mail, such as filtering and optout mechanisms, do not appear to work well.
3. Most consumers define spam by their relationship with the sender or
the type of the e-mail they receive. They don't think of spam in terms of
an opt-out or opt-in permission to receive e-mail messages.
4. Consumers
want redress and greater control over their e-mail
14
inboxes.
II.

DO-NOT-CALL REGISTRY MODEL MAY NOT BE
TRANSFERABLE TO DO-NOT-SPAM

A Do-Not-Spam registry would have many similar traits to the DoNot-Call telephone registry, so a brief review of how the Do-Not-Call
telephone registry began may be helpful in assessing the potential success of a Do-Not-Spam registry.
A.
1.

Do-NOT-CALL

STARTED WITH

TCPA

Congress Found Telemarketers Mobile and Consumer Fraud Over
Forty Billion Dollars a Year
In 1991, Congress passed the Telephone Consumer Protection Act

11. ePrivacy Group, "Background" <http://www.eprivacygroup.com/pdfs/Background
03.pdf> (accessed Dec. 2, 2003). ePrivacy Group is based in Philadelphia and is a privately
held company. It promotes itself as an advisor to corporations on governments on spam
and other electronic privacy and security issues.
12. 2003 Privacy Trust Survey <http://cioi.web.cmu.edu/research/2003PrivacyTrustSurveyExecutiveSummary.pdf> (accessed Dec. 2, 2003). Ponemon Institute describes itself
as a "think tank" dedicated to advancing responsible information management practices in
business and government. It is headquartered in Tucson, Arizona.
13. Executive Summary, 2003 Consumer Spam Report, ePrivacy Group and Ponemon
Institute, <http://www.eprivacygroup.net/spamstudy/2003ConsumerSpamStudyExecutive
Summary.pdf> (accessed Jan. 17, 2004).
14. Id. at 1.
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("TCPA") of 1991.15 Among the findings supporting the passage of the
legislation was that telemarketing differs from other activities because:
-Telemarketing can be carried out by sellers across state lines without
direct contact with the consumer; and
-Telemarketers are very mobile, moving from state to state.
In 1991, it was estimated that consumers lost forty billion dollars a
year through telemarketing fraud and that there were 300,000 solicitors
to eighteen million Americans every day that generated sales of $435
billion annually.
B.

FTC

AND

FCC

GIVEN RULE-MAKING AUTHORITY UNDER

TCPA

Under the TCPA, the FTC and Federal Communications Commis16
sion ("FCC") were charged with carrying out the intent of the Act.
Both passed rules and regulations regarding telephone solicitation. In
1991, neither agency proposed implementing the TCPA provision 17 that
allowed for the establishing of a national database of residential customers who objected to telemarketing calls and establishing rules to prevent
calls to such consumers. The rules adopted in 1991 basically provided
consumers with the ability to "opt-out" from receiving unwanted telephone solicitations by contacting each individual company or marketer
that the consumer wished to block and to be placed on a company-specific
"Do-Not-Call" list. The TCPA provided that the two agencies were to review the success of the regulations five years after passage and make a
report to Congress. During its required five-year review, the FTC found
several problems with the company-specific Do-Not-Call scheme,
including:
-The company-specific approach was extremely burdensome to
consumers.
-Consumers' repeated requests to be placed on a Do-Not-Call list were
ignored.
-Consumers had no way to verify that their names had been taken off a
company's telemarketing list.
time-con-The private right of action provision was very complex and
18
suming and placed the evidentiary burden on consumers.

15. 15 U.S.C. § 6101.
16. The authority of the FTC generally is to prevent deceptive trade practices. The
FCC's authority is over telecommunications, including common carriers.
17. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(3)(A)-(L) (2003).
18. 68 Fed. Reg. 4629 (Jan. 29, 2003).
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C.
1.

RULES ESTABLISHED FOR Do-NOT-CALL REGISTRY

FTC / FCC to Jointly Regulate Registry

In an attempt to solve these problems, one recommendation by the
FTC after the review was to supplement the then company-specific DoNot-Call provisions 19 to include a central "Do-Not-Call" registry maintained by the FTC to stop calls from all companies within the FTC's
20
jurisdiction.
In adopting its rules for the Do-Not-Call registry, 2 1 the FTC limited
the list to residential customers only. Also, the FTC found it had no jurisdiction to exclude calls from common carriers, banks, credit unions,
savings and loans, companies engaged in the business of insurance, airlines, and intra-state calls. The FTC also excluded tax-exempt non-profit
organizations but said it would revisit the exemption if problems developed. 22 All of the groups still are subject to deceptive trade practice violation enforcement actions by the FTC and company-specific Do-Not-Call
requests from consumers.
In response to the FTC action, in 2003, Congress passed the Do Not
Call Implementation Act. 2 3 The 2003 Do Not Call Act provided the funding mechanism to allow the FTC to establish the national Do-Not-Call
registry. An initial contract of three and a half million dollars was
awarded to AT&T to assist the FTC in establishing the registry. The
registry is to be self-funding 2 4 and is expected to generate seventy-three
million dollars in user fees over the 2003-2008 time-frame.
After the FTC completed its rule-making for the registry, the FCC
took up consideration of its mandate regarding the Do-Not-Call regis19. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(3)(A)-(L). Under this provision, a consumer can request that he
or she not receive telephone solicitation by giving notice to each company he or she wants to
preclude. For those who do not sign up on the Do-Not-Call list, they still can block
telemarketers for specified companies by contacting those companies individually.
20. Federal Trade Commission, Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 4583 (Dec. 18,
2002).
21. 68 Fed. Reg. 4580 (Jan. 29, 2003).
22. Id. "Nevertheless, if experience indicates that the company-specific approach does
not in fact provide adequate protection for consumers' privacy in the context of charitable
solicitation telemarketing, the Commission may revisit this decision in the future, and reconsider whether to require telemarketing calls soliciting charitable donations to comply
with the national 'Do-Not-Call' registry requirements." Id.
23. Public L. No. 108.10.
24. Telemarketing Sales Rule Amended to Establish Fees for Industry Access to National Do Not Call Registry <http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/07/trsfeesfrn.htm.> (accessed
July 29, 2003). The FTC has established the annual access cost of companies for the registry at twenty-five dollars per area code, up to a maximum annual fee of $7,375 to access
numbers for the entire country. There is no fee for companies to access the first five area
codes.
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try.2 5 It agreed that there would be only one Do-Not-Call registry maintained by the FTC.26 Because of its jurisdiction over telecommunications
generally, the FCC rules filled the gap as far as including common carriers, banks, insurance companies, airlines, and both intrastate and wireless numbers 27 under its rules.
2.

Telemarketers Given 'Safe-Harbor'Provision

Pursuant to the TCPA, the regulations adopted by the FTC and the
FCC include a "safe harbor" 28 provision where a telemarketer would not
be liable for penalties and damages to consumers if it can establish:
-It has established and implemented written procedures to comply with
Do-Not-Call rules.
-It has trained its personnel in procedures established pursuant to the
Do-Not-Call rules.
-It has maintained a list of telephone numbers that it may not contact.
-It uses a process to prevent calls to those on the Do-Not-Call
list using
29
a version of the registry no more than three months old.
-Any subsequent call otherwise violating the rules is the result of an
error.
3.

Three-Exemptions to Do-Not-Call Registry

There are three categories of calls exempted from the restrictions of
the Do-Not-Call provisions. They are:
a. Established Business Relationships. This is defined as a relationship where a consumer has purchased, rented or leased seller's
goods or services within eighteen months immediately preceding
the date of the call or where there has been a consumer inquiry or

application regarding a product or service offered30 by the seller
within three months preceding the date of the call.
b. Prior Express Permission. Express prior permission must be evi25. The FCC considered its mandate in CG Docket No. 02-278, In the Matter of Rules
and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer ProtectionAct of 1991, Report and
Order adopted June 26, 2003 and released July 3, 2003, hereinafter referred to as the FCC
Order.
26. FCC Order at 28. The FCC and FTC are to enter into a Memorandum of Understanding to outline the respective federal responsibilities of each agency. FCC Order at
75.
27. FCC Order at 33.
28. FCC Order at 38 (adopting FTC safe harbor provision 16 CFR Part 310.4(b)(3) at
68 Fed. Reg. 4645).
29. The registry itself is to be updated daily and made available for downloading on a
constant basis so that telemarketers can access the registry at any time.
30. FCC Order at 42.
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c.

4.

denced by a signed, 3 1 written agreement between the consumer and
the seller that states that the consumer agrees to be contacted by
the seller, including the telephone number to which the calls may
32
be placed.
Tax-Exempt Nonprofit Organizations.This includes not only the organization itself but also calls made by independent telemarketers
33
on behalf of tax-exempt nonprofit organizations.

Federal Regulations Trump State Laws

The adoption of the federal Do-Not-Call registry conflicts with some
existing state laws restricting telemarketers. The following conflicts of
law principles apply: if a state has not adopted any Do-Not-Call rules,
the federal rules will govern exclusively for both intrastate and interstate telephone solicitations. 3 4 For states that have adopted Do-Not-Call
regulations, the federal rules constitute a "floor, and therefore would supersede all less restrictive state Do-Not-Call rules."35 The FCC found
that "application of less restrictive state exemptions directly conflicts
with the federal objectives in protecting consumer privacy rights under
the TCPA. Thus, telemarketers must comply with the federal Do-NotCall rules even if the state in which they are telemarketing has adopted
an otherwise applicable exception." 36 States are prohibited from passing
37
any regulations more restrictive than the federal rules.
5.

FCC Rules Require 'Opt-In' for Facsimile Transmissions

One area in which the FCC goes beyond the regulations imposed by
the FTC's Do-Not-Call registry pertains to unsolicited facsimile advertisements. The TCPA prohibits the sending of an "unsolicited advertisement" to a facsimile machine. 38 Unlike the Do-Not-Call registry, this
31. A signature includes an electronic or digital form of signature, to the extent that
such form of signature is recognized as a valid signature under applicable federal or state
contract law. See footnote 158 in FCC Order.
32. FCC Order at T 44.
33. FCC Order at

45; see MainstreamMarketing Services, Inc. et. al. v. Federal Trade

Commission et. al., Case No. 03 N 0184, slip opinion (Sept. 25, 2003) (the distinction between solicitations by commercial entities versus tax-exempt organizations was the critical
factor that caused the U.S. District Court in Colorado to issue an injunction halting the
implementation of the registry finding that the Do-Not-Call registry did not materially advance the government's interest in curbing abusive or fraudulent telemarketing calls,
thereby making the registry fail stringent First Amendment scrutiny). A stay of the District Court's injunction was issued by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals on October 7,
2003.
34. FCC Order at T 80.
35. FCC Order at 81.
36. Id.

37. Id. at 82.
38. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C).
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opt-in provision applies to both residential and commercial consumers as
well. The FCC found that consumers felt they were "besieged" by unsolicited faxes.
Consumers emphasize that the burden of receiving unsolicited faxes is
not just limited to the cost of paper and toner, but includes the time
spent reading and disposing of faxes, the time the machine is printing
an advertisement and is not operational for other purposes, and the intrusiveness of faxes transmitted at inconvenient times, including in the
middle of the night.3 9
The existing rule allowed faxes to be sent where there was an existing business relationship. The FCC's new rule requires a person or
entity sending unsolicited facsimile advertising to obtain the prior express invitation or permission of the recipient before transmitting an unsolicited fax. The express permission "must be in writing and include the
recipient's signature," the recipient must clearly indicate consent to receiving such fax advertisements from the company and the recipient
must provide a fax number to which faxes may be sent. 40 The signature
may be in an electronic or digital form to the extent such is recognized as
a valid signature under applicable law. The permission cannot be in the
41
form of a "negative option."
III.

DO-NOT-CALL REGISTRY INAPPROPRIATE AS MODEL FOR
REGULATING SPAM

On a first glance, it would appear that there are many similarities
between telemarketing and spam that would make the Do-Not-Call registry an ideal framework for a Do-Not-Spam registry. Spammers are
similar to telemarketers in that spamming, like telemarketing, is carried
out across state lines (indeed, even over international boundaries).
Spammers, like telemarketers, are very mobile, moving from state-tostate and from one Internet service provider to another on almost a moment's notice.
A.

OPT-OUT MAY ONLY CONFIRM WHERE TO SEND SPAM

While spamming and telemarketing have many of the same traits, it
does not follow that the same remedies can be applied to stop spamming.
For example, it is nearly impossible to stop spamming on a companyspecific basis since spammers work for many companies and can sent out
multiple spam messages for different clients almost instantaneously.
Moreover, Internet users believe that using an opt-out link on spam mes39. FCC Order at
40. FCC Order at
41. FCC Order at

186.
187.
191.
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sage either does not work or merely confirms the existence of the e-mail
address for future spamming.
Will a Do-Not-Spam list work in the same way as the do-not call list?
In the view of at least one commentator, no. "To any non-expert, the
question suggests that such registries would work must the way Do-Not42
Call lists work. They won't."
Unlike telemarketers, spammers do not want to talk to you. Rather,
spammers often do their best to hide who they are through various
means. The e-mail they send has been altered in several ways. First,
the "From" line is faked. Second, headers and other pertinent data do
not equal the "Sender" line. Third, other data and information as to the
source of the e-mail has been changed so that it cannot be quickly traced.
Fourth, the "Subject" line is usually ambiguous or misleading. And, as
mentioned above, the opt-out link, if it exists, is either inoperative, goes
to someone other than the spammer's e-mail (thus, clogging an innocent
party's inbox) or is ignored by the spammer.
For these reasons, many believe that a do not spam list would only
make the problem worse. "If the e-mail address is in the Do-Not-Spare
registry, then the fact that there's a live person using that inbox is virtually guaranteed and the spammer has you."' 4 3 This could happen even
though the Do-Not-Spam list is not given to the spammer. Merely by
having addresses purged from a larger list would indicate to the spammer that your address is a valid e-mail address.
B.

PROPOSED LEGISLATION WOULD REQUIRE OPTING-OUT

In 2003, Congress considered several bills that addressed the spain
issue. The Burns-Wyden bill 44 banned deceptive subject lines and required valid return addresses and a way to opt out of future commercial
e-mail. This bill was passed by Congress as the Controlling the Assault
of Non-Solicited Pornographyand Marketing Act of 2003, also known as
the CAN SPAM Act of 2003. A bill by Sen. Charles Schumer that would
have required the FTC to create a Do-Not-Spain registry similar to the
Do-Not-Call registry failed to pass. 4 5 A Wall Street Journal article found
that some big spammers support this type of legislation.
Consumer groups object to the bills not only because they still allow
companies to send spam but also because they require consumers to
take the trouble of removing themselves from the companies' e-mail
lists and fail to allow consumers themselves to sue companies over
42. Berlind, David, Why Do-not-spam Lists are a Bad Idea <http://
techupdate.zdnet.com/techupdate/stories/main/0,14179,2914363,00.html> (July 28, 2003).
43. Id.
44. Senate Bill 877, 108th Cong. (2003) (CAN-SPAM Act of 2003).
45. Senate Bill 1231, 108th Cong. (2003) (Stop Pornographyand Abusive Marketing
Act).
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46

The Direct Marketing Association's position is that it supports federal legislation that preempts state laws and that provides for penalties
47
for violations of what it calls its three principles articulated as:
1. Adherence to the Four Pillars of Responsible E-mail Marketing. A.
An honest subject line. B. No forging of headers or technology deceptions. C. Identity of the sender, which includes a physical address. D.
An opt-out that works and is easily to find and easy to use.
2. No Harvesting. No surreptitious acquisition of e-mail addresses via
automated mechanisms without the consumer/customer's awareness
and agreement. This includes prohibition on dictionary attaches or
other mechanisms for creating e-mail addresses without the awareness
and prior approval of the addressee.
3. Universal Opt-out. All commercial e-mailed communications must
include a standardized out-out. This would include communications to
customers as well as prospects and would utilize a standardized
48
symbol.
C.

EUROPEAN UNION REQUIRES OPT-IN TO RECEIVE SPAM

Rather than requiring consumers to "opt-out" by signing up on a registry, the European Union has adopted a directive requiring consumers
to "opt-in" to receive commercial e-mail. Under the European Union's
directive, "electronic mail for the purposes of direct marketing may only
be allowed in respect of subscribers who have given their prior consent."49 Moreover, direct marketing messages by e-mail may not conceal
or disguise the identity of the sender. 50 This provision is to take effect
for all EU members by October 31, 2003.51
An "opt-in" approach to spam is better than the "opt-out" mechanisms envisioned by Congress. 5 2 By definition, a person who opts in
46. Dreazen, Yochi, Why Some Big Spammers are Backing Spam-Control Laws, Wall
St. J., B1 (July 18, 2003).
47. The DMA, Direct Marketing Association Anti-spam Working Strategy <http:ll

www.the-dma.org/cgi/disppressrelease?article=452> (accessed Dec. 2, 2003) (the DMA also
proposes to establish a "Gold List" where companies agree to adhere to these principles.
The companies would post a $500 bond per entity and a violation of the principles would
result in the forfeiture of the bond).
48. Id.

49. Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July
2002, Official Journal of the European Communities 31.7.2002, L201/45.
50. Id. at 46.
51. EU Institutions Press Releases, Questions and Answers on Spain and the EU Optin Regime <http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?reslist> (accessed Dec. 2, 2003).
52. See Mainstream Marketing Services, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 283 F.

Supp. 2d 1151 (D. Colo. 2003) (an opt-in approach would eliminate the distinction between
commercial entities and charitable organizations that the U.S. District Court in Colorado
found violated the First Amendment).

2003]

THE DO-NOT-CALL REGISTRY MODEL

would be receiving solicited commercial e-mails. It also prevents any potential abuse of an "opt-out" list by spammers who either improperly obtained the list or use the list's scrubbing mechanism to verify e-mail
addresses. But even with an opt-in requirement, legislation would not
be adequate unless there is a way to stop or impose economic sanctions
for the unsolicited commercial e-mail. What is the most effective way to
do this?
TV.

A BETTER APPROACH: OPT-IN WITH BENEFICIARY LIABLE
FOR PENALTIES

As noted above, the only fact that is consistently valid and correct in
an e-mail spam is the hyperlink to the Web site that the spammer wants
the recipient to visit and, hopefully, buy the product or service or provide
information. This should be the starting point for any effective legislation. In the words of Deep Throat: "Follow the money."53 In other words,
any effective anti-spam legislation should not only require the recipient
of the e-mail to opt in but also should impose penalties on the party who
benefits from the spam if the recipient has not opted in. For example, if
the spam hyperlink is to XYZ Mortgage Company, then XYZ Mortgage
Company, as well as the spammer would be liable for spamming unless
the recipient had opted-in to receive the message or XYZ Mortgage could
demonstrate that it was not responsible for the message or did not benefit economically from traffic being driven to its Web site by the unsolicited commercial e-mail. Furthermore, any legislation must include both
residential and commercial Internet users.
53. "Deep Throat" was the secret source that Washington Post reporters Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward relied upon in breaking the Watergate scandal. They would meet
Deep Throat in a parking garage. At a time when it looked as though they made several
reporting errors and there was no future in the investigation, Bob Woodward had this exchange with Deep Throat:
Woodward: The story is dry. All we've got are pieces. We can't seem to figure out
what the puzzle is supposed to look like. John Mitchell resigns as the head of
CREEP, and says that he wants to spend more time with his family. I mean, it
sounds like bullshit, we don't exactly believe that...
Deep Throat: No, heh, but it's touching. Forget the myths the media's created
about the White House. The truth is, these are not very bright guys, and things
out of hand.
Woodward: Hunt's come in from the cold. Supposedly, he's got a lawyer with
$25,000 in a brown paper bag.
Deep Throat: Follow the money.
Woodward: What do you mean? Where?
Deep Throat: Oh, I can't tell you that.
Woodward: But you could tell me that.
Deep Throat: No, I have to do this my way. You tell me what you know, and I'll
confirm. I'll keep you in the right direction if I can, but that's all. Just ... follow
the money.
All the President's Men, Warner Bros. (1976).
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PROPOSAL WOULD BENEFIT BOTH SENDER AND RECIPIENTS

This would have two benefits. First, for legitimate commercial emailers, they still could develop an e-mail list for advertising. Since recipients would not be deluged with unsolicited commercial e-mail, the
commercial e-mails that they receive presumably would have more impact and time spent in preparing and sending the commercial e-mail.
Second, for recipients of unwanted commercial e-mail, it would give them
a valid starting point if they wanted to track down and stop the unwanted e-mail. The site to which the commercial e-mail is driving traffic
has an economic interest in the e-mail and should be responsible for it.
Presumably, the Web site has either directly contracted with the spammer or has an affiliate program where a third party is receiving payment
for driving traffic to the Web site. In either case, the Web site would
know, or should know, with whom it either had direct marketing contracts with or with whom it has established an affiliate relationship to
pay for traffic to the Web site. By making the Web site owner liable as
well as the spammer, the Web site has every incentive to police its commercial e-mail distribution or face civil action and monetary penalties.
This approach would be consistent with the restrictions on unsolicited facsimile advertisements that have been upheld by courts. Moreover, it would be consistent with the opt-in requirement that the
European Union has implemented.

B.

PROPOSAL IS CONSISTENT WITH COURT-APPROVED
FACSIMILE RULINGS

TCPA

As noted earlier, the TCPA prohibits the sending of an "unsolicited
advertisement" to a facsimile machine. 54 An "unsolicited advertisement"
is defined under the statute as "any material advertising the commercial
availability, or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person's prior express invitation or
permission." 5 5 Prior to the rewriting of the facsimile rules by the FCC,
the permission was presumed where there was an existing business relationship. Under the new rule, the FCC requires that permission be given
56
in writing and signed by the recipient.
1.

Commercial Speech Given Lesser Protection

The old rule had been challenged on several occasions with the result that the TCPA restriction was found not to be an impermissible
First Amendment restriction on commercial speech. The question of
54. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C).
55. 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(4).
56. FCC Order at 191.
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"commercial speech" as it pertains to advertising is found in CentralHudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New
York. 57 Unlike the limited restrictions on facsimile advertising imposed
under the TCPA, in Central Hudson, the electric utility was totally
banned by the state regulatory authority from conducting any promotional advertising for electricity. The reason given for the ban was to
prevent the consumption of energy during the energy crisis. The Supreme Court found the total ban on advertising violated the First and
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution since it unduly restricted
commercial speech, "that is, expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience." 58 The court explained that even
though the Constitution "accords a lesser protection to commercial
speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression... [t]he protection available for particular commercial expression turns on the nature both of the expression and of the governmental interests served by
its regulation." 5 9 Because the ban in Central Hudson was total, it exceeded the interest being asserted by the government.
For commercial speech cases, the court in Central Hudson said a
four-part analysis was necessary. The four parts of the test are:
1. The speech must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.
2. The governmental interest must be substantial.
If the answer to the first two parts of the test is positive, then:
3. The regulation directly advances the governmental interest
asserted.
4. The regulation is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that
60
interest.
2.

Facsimile Provisions of TCPA are Valid Exercise of Governmental
Regulation of Speech

The Eighth Circuit used Central Hudson in determining that that
facsimile provision in the TCPA was constitutional. In State of Missouri
v. American Blast Fax, Inc.,61 the appellate court reversed a finding by
the district court that had found the TCPA to be unconstitutional. In
American Blast Fax, the State of Missouri sued American Blast Fax and
Fax.com, Inc. for violating the TCPA by sending facsimiles to consumers
in Missouri. The district court had dismissed the complaint after finding
the TCPA was unconstitutional because it unduly restricted commercial
62
speech.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

447 U.S. 557 (1980).
Id. at 561.
Id. at 563.
Id. at 564.
323 F.3d 649 (8th Cir. 2003).
State of Missouri v.American Blast Fax, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 920 (E.D. Mo. 2002).
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In reversing the district court, the appellate court applied the fourpart test. It first found that there was no allegation that the materials in
the facsimiles were misleading or concerned unlawful activity.
As to the second factor-governmental interest-the court found "a
substantial governmental interest in restricting unsolicited fax advertisements in order to prevent the cost shifting and interference such unwanted advertising places on the recipient."6 3 The court found "the
harms of unsolicited fax advertising are real and have not been elimi64
nated by technological changes."
For the third factor, the court concluded that the regulation did advance the governmental interest of protecting members of the public
65
from bearing the cost of unwanted advertising.
Last, the court found that the restriction was not more extensive
than was necessary. The court said the fourth factor of Central Hudson
does not mean that in commercial speech the restraint does not have to
be the "least restrictive" but rather must be a reasonable restriction. Restricting commercial facsimile advertisements to those that have agreed
to receive them is not unreasonably restrictive.
Advertisers remain free to publicize their products through any legal
means; they simply cannot do so through an unsolicited fax. TCPA does
not act as a total ban on fax advertising. Advertisers may obtain consent for their faxes through such means as telephone solicitation, direct
mailings, and interaction with customers in their shops. . . [citation
omitted.] While it is true that the effect of TCPA will be that some consumers will not receive unsolicited advertisements they might have appreciated, under the approach advocated by FC [Fax.com] there would
always be individuals suffering costs and interference from unwanted
advertisements. It was not unreasonable for Congress to choose a system that protects those who would otherwise be forced to bear unwanted burdens over those who wish to send and receive unsolicited fax
advertising. Given the cost shifting and interference imposed by unsolicited commercial faxes and the many alternatives left available to adserved
vertisers, TCPA's approach is 'in proportion to the interest
66
[and is] narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.'
Using similar rational, the TCPA's anti-facsimile provision was
found valid in State of Texas v. American Blastfax, Inc.,67 and Covington
68
& Burling v. InternationalMarketing & Research, Inc.
63. 323 F.3d at 656.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 658.
66. Id. at 659.
67. 121 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (W.D. Tex. 2000).
68. 2003 WL 21384825 (D.C. Super. 2003).
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3. Proposal Would Meet Central Hudson Tests
By applying the four-part Central Hudson test to the proposal to
limit unsolicited commercial e-mail only to recipients who have opted in
to receive them, the proposal would not be a violation of the First
Amendment.
a)

Spam Frequently Contains Misleading Headers, "From"and
"Subject" Information

First, in order to be protected commercial speech, the speech must
concern lawful activity and must not be misleading. While the TCPA
facsimile cases found that the speech concerned lawful activity and was
not misleading, a similar finding would not be true for much of the unsolicited commercial e-mail. As discussed earlier, a great deal of the unsolicited commercial e-mail contains false "From" information, false header
information, false, misleading or deceptive Subject lines, and inoperative
"opt-out" hyperlinks. Under the first test, unsolicited commercial e-mail
would not even qualify as "commercial speech" of the type to be afforded
69
any protection under Central Hudson.
b)

Governmental Interest in Regulating Spam is Substantial

The second Central Hudson test is that the governmental interest
must be substantial. Protection of consumers from false and misleading
70
e-mails is an area in which the governmental interest is substantial.
Also, there is a substantial interest in the cost shifting that occurs with
e-mails where the cost is borne by the consumers, not the entity sending
the e-mails. The costs that are imposed on the recipients are real in
time, money and resources used, just as it is in the case of unsolicited
facsimiles. 7 1 As discussed earlier, the costs to the Internet, ISPs and
consumers is in the billions of dollars annually.

69. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 ("[tlhe government may ban forms of communications more likely to deceive the public than to inform it").
70. See FederalTrade Commission et. al. v. MainstreamMarketingServices, Inc. et. al.,
345 F.3d 850 (10th Cir. 2003) (in its order granting a stay of the U.S. District Court of
Colorado's order enjoining the implementation of the Do-Not-Call registry, the Tenth Circuit found that "preventing abusive and coercive sales practices and protecting privacy are
substantial governmental interests").
71. See Covington & Burling, 2003 WL 21384825 at *3 (D.C. Super. 2003) ("Congress
has a substantial interest in preventing business disruptions caused by the receipt of numerous unsolicited faxes").
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Regulation of Spam Advances the Government's Interest in
ProtectingConsumers

Third, Central Hudson requires that the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted. In addition to the governmental need to protect recipients from deceptive and misleading
unsolicited commercial e-mail, the recipients also need to be protected
from cost shifting. These costs to the recipients are real in time and in
dollars. By restricting commercial e-mails to those who specifically opt
in to receive such solicitations, these governmental interests are served.
d)

Opt-in Requirement is Necessary to Serve the Interest of Protecting
Internet Users

The fourth Central Hudson test requires that the regulation be no
more extensive than is necessary to serve the governmental interest it is
seeking to protect. A requirement that senders of commercial e-mails
have specific permission first is not overly broad to protect the interests.
The restriction is not a total ban on commercial e-mail. It does not restrict the content of the commercial e-mail. Rather, it merely ensures
that the recipient of the e-mail wants to receive it. This regulation would
reduce the burden on the Internet, reduce costs for the recipient while
allowing commercial e-mail to continue to be sent to a more targeted
audience.
C.

MONETARY PENALTIES FOR THE BENEFICIARY OF SPAM IS AN
APPROPRIATE REMEDY

Finally, a word about imposing liability on the beneficiary of the unsolicited commercial e-mail. The TCPA allows for a private cause of action to be brought in state court to recover for monetary loss or $500 in
damages for each violation, whichever is greater. 72 This provision has
been interpreted "to apply not only to the actual sender of the unsolicited
faxes, but also to the companies whose products are advertised." 73 The
same should be true for unsolicited commercial e-mails. The ultimate
Web site where the spammer is driving traffic should be liable for damages as well. Moreover, any legislation should allow for the aggregating
of claims so that more than one aggrieved recipient can join together to
bring a case against either the spammer or the ultimate Web site owner.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Do-Not-Call registry may be appropriate for telemarketers, but
using an opt-out mechanism for unsolicited commercial e-mail would be
72. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B).
73. Covington Burling, 2003 WL 21384825.
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inadequate to control spam. As a result, any federal legislation should
provide for an opt-in scenario with penalties that can be assessed not
only against the spammer but also the beneficiary whose Web site is receiving the traffic generated by the unsolicited commercial e-mail.
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